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One form of confirmation bias is the tendency for people to ignore 
information that is inconsistent with their current beliefs. While confirmation 
bias is the subject of both analytical models and experiments in accounting 
and finance, its effect on market prices has not been studied due to limitations 
associated with traditional financial markets. In eleven real-money movie box 
office prediction markets, confirmation bias was induced in all traders via the 
explanation effect, i.e. a requirement to submit a box office forecast and an 
explanation prior to trading. When all traders are subject to confirmation bias, 
market prices do not accurately reflect new, value-relevant information. 
However, in comparable a set of seven real-money movie prediction markets 
that included both traders who have not been subject to explanation 
requirement and those who have, we find efficient incorporation of new 
information into market prices. This study extends our knowledge of the 
conditions under which individual trader biases affect market prices and 
provides potential insights into open questions about forecasting errors among 
financial analysts. 
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The behavioral finance literature suggests that individual level biases 
affect the judgments of investors and that these biases can ultimately lead to 
irrational market prices (e.g. Odean, 1998; Barberis and Thaler, 2001). 
Proponents of market efficiency counter that the biases exhibited by 
individuals are eliminated in the market place (e.g., Camerer, 1987; Fama, 
1998; Rubenstein, 2001). The few experimental tests of this assertion (e.g., 
Camerer, 1987; Ganguly, Kagel and Moser, 1994; Kluger and Wyatt, 2004; 
Tuttle, Coller and Burton, 1997; Teschner, Wagenschwanz and Weinhardt, 
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2012) have generated mixed results leaving open the question of under what 
conditions do individual level biases affect market prices.   
Since information processing is a key aspect of financial markets (e.g., 
Lucas, 1972; Grossman, 1981; Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam, 1998; 
Plott, 2000; Pouget, Sauvagnat and Villenueve, 2014), any biases in the way 
market participants or intermediaries (i.e., equity research analysts, financial 
statement auditors, etc.) incorporate new information into their beliefs and 
behavior is of great interest in the fields of accounting and finance.  One of 
the most widely studied psychological biases in human information 
processing is confirmation bias, which is the tendency of individuals to put 
too much weight on information that confirms their prior views and too little 
weight on disconfirming information (e.g., Lord, Lepper, Ross, 1979; Evans, 
1989; Nickerson, 1998, Shefrin, 2007; Hart, Albarracın, Eagly, Brechan, 
Lindberg, Merrill, 2009).  While the prior views of investors regarding 
particular securities in traditional markets are typically unobservable, equity 
research analysts do provide forecasts of companies’ future performance with 
detailed explanations of their rationale behind the forecasts to the public.  
Subsequently, these analysts revise their forecasts as new information 
becomes available. Analysts do not typically invest in the securities they 
follow, but investors do consider analyst forecasts and forecast revisions in 
their trading decisions (i.e., Liu, 2003; Hughes, Liu and Su, 2008).  Thus, if 
confirmation bias is impacting the forecast revision process of analysts, it 
could also be impacting market prices set by traders relying on analyst 
forecasts.   
In this paper, we study the effect of confirmation bias on market prices in 
a set of eighteen real money movie box office prediction markets.  In eleven 
of these markets, all participants played the dual role of 1) analyst, by 
submitting a detailed written forecast of the movie’s box office receipts as 
well as explanations to support their forecast, and 2) investors, by trading 
securities whose value is derived from the movie’s box office receipts.  
Numerous psychological studies of the “explanation effect” (e.g., Anderson, 
Lepper, Ross, 1980; Koehler, 1991; Hammersley, Kadous, Magro, 1997) 
suggest that the written forecast explanation task will induce confirmation 
bias in these traders. While we do not require these traders to report revised 
forecasts during their market participation, we are able to indirectly measure 
their revised beliefs through the security prices they set in those markets.  In 
other words, rather than measuring traders’ forecast revisions, we measure the 
aggregate results of traders’ behavior – market prices – that theoretically 
reveal all traders’ updated forecasts.  As such, we are able to measure the 
potential impact of confirmation bias on market prices by measuring the 
collective behavior of participants playing the roles of both analyst and 
investor.  
Using a real-money prediction market for this study provides important 
advantages. First, studying the impact of confirmation bias on prices in 
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naturally occurring market settings is difficult with traditional archival 
research techniques because investors’ prior beliefs are typically unknown. 
Consequently, most financial research in this area consists of experiments 
wherein a participant’s initial beliefs about the ultimate value of a financial 
security are randomly assigned by the researcher (e.g., Eames, Glover & 
Kennedy, 2006; Hales, 2007; Han & Tan, 2010; Thayer, 2011) rather than 
being based on a subject’s own information processing as they often are in the 
sociology and psychology literatures (e.g., Ross, Lepper, Strack & Steinmetz, 
1977; Sherman, 1980; Sherman, Skov, Hervitz & Stock, 1981; Tetlock, 1985; 
Koehler, 1991; Ditto, Munro, Apanovitch, Scepansky & Lockhart, 1998). 
Similar to Hammersley, et al. (1997), we induce confirmation bias by 
measuring subjects’ initial beliefs via a written explanation.  We believe that 
this element of external validity in our design is important because prior 
beliefs outside of the laboratory arise due to individuals’ background and 
information processing, not random assignment.  
Second, we measure how confirmation bias impacts the behavior of those 
who might be subject to it. While numerous studies in psychology examine 
how changes in beliefs are affected by the explanation effect (i.e., Anderson 
and Wright, 1988; Hammersley, et al., 1997; Hammersley, 2011), there are no 
studies in which individual or collective behavior is measured as a function of 
both participants’ initial beliefs and information received subsequent to initial 
belief formation and explanation.  Ultimately, behavior of individuals in 
markets is what most market research attempts to understand irrespective of 
what market participants claim to believe.  In the face of new information 
received subsequent to initial belief formation and explanation, we believe 
that behavior (i.e., buying and selling securities at various prices) is a more 
relevant measure of the impact of confirmation bias than merely asking 
subjects their updated beliefs (i.e., revised forecasts). 
Third, because traders are participating in a real-money prediction market, 
there is an appropriate level of financial incentives. In controlled experiments, 
researchers induce confirmation bias regarding news about a financial security 
via endowment (i.e., Hales, 2007). However, without the financial incentives 
associated with market participation, it is unclear whether the effects of 
confirmation bias on individuals will ultimately impact market prices.  
In eleven of the movie prediction markets, all traders are asked to provide 
a written forecast of the 4 week box office performance of a soon-to-be-
released movie. The traders then participate in a real-money futures market 
where the values of the contracts being traded are tied to the 4 week box 
office performance of a given movie. This creates a unique market setting that 
contains both an appropriate level of financial stakes and traders whose prior 
beliefs are measured in a manner that induces confirmation bias. We measure 
the ability of traders to accurately revise their initial forecasts in a very 
powerful manner – by measuring the changes in contract prices after new, 
highly relevant information is revealed to the market.  
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In this paper, we test two hypotheses. First, in markets populated 
exclusively by traders who have submitted written forecasts and supporting 
justifications, we expect that security prices will not fully reflect new 
information as a result of all traders exhibiting behavior consistent with 
confirmation bias (Pouget, et al., 2014). Consistent with our first hypothesis, 
we find that prices in these markets do reveal traders’ significant under-
weighting of a value-relevant, public information signal.  
In seven additional markets, traders who were required to provide initial 
forecasts are joined by (presumptively) unbiased traders who are not subjected 
to that requirement.  Our second hypothesis is that security prices will fully 
reflect new information in markets with a mixture of traders with induced 
confirmation bias and unbiased traders (Forsythe, Nelson, Neumann & 
Wright, 1992; Pouget, et al., 2014).  Consistent with our second hypothesis, 
we find prices in these seven markets reveal traders’ complete weighting of a 
value-relevant, public information signal.    
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents background 
literature on confirmation bias, how the explanation effect can induce 
confirmation bias and the effect of confirmation bias on market prices. 
Section 3 provides background information on our markets, our measures and 
our information signal. Section 4 focuses on the model we used to test our 
hypotheses. In Section 5, we present our results. Section 6 concludes with a 
discussion of our findings and directions for future research.   
 
2 RELATED RESEARCH  
 
2.1 CONFIRMATION BIAS 
 
Confirmation bias is one of the best known and most often studied 
decision making biases (see Evans, 1989, Nickerson, 1998, Hart, et al., 2009 
and/or Pouget, et al., 2014 for extensive reviews of the confirmation bias 
literature). It is generally defined as “the seeking out or interpreting of 
evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs.” (Nickerson, 1998, p. 
175). In general, the two primary sources of confirmation bias in human 
cognition are 1) meaning change and/or 2) biased assimilation (Bodenhausen, 
1988; Nickerson, 1998). On the one hand, meaning change is the human 
tendency to interpret information in a manner that makes it support prior 
beliefs whether or not it does. On the other hand, biased assimilation refers to 
the tendency to give more attention and more weight to information that 
corroborates prior beliefs and less attention and less weight to information 
that contradicts those prior beliefs. It is this latter source of confirmation bias 
– biased assimilation – which we expect to affect traders in our study who 
forecast a future event, justify that forecast in writing and then trade in a 
prediction market where new, value-relevant information is made public.   
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The effects of confirmation bias have been incorporated into a number of 
financial models including Daniel, et al. (1998) and Rabin and Schrag (1999). 
In a market model set forth in Daniel, et al. (1998), trader overconfidence is 
the source of the biased assimilation form of confirmation bias. By modeling 
the weight placed on a privately-generated signal in assessing an asset’s value 
as a function of an individual’s confidence, Daniel, et al. (1998) show that the 
biased individual incorrectly perceives his initial private information to be 
more precise than subsequently received public information.  This leads the 
individual to overweigh his initial private information and underweight value-
relevant, public information in estimating an asset’s value unless it confirms 
his private information.  As a result, security prices in asset markets populated 
with this type of biased trader are predicted to not reflect the rational 
incorporation of new information over time.  
Rabin and Schrag (1999) directly model the effects of the meaning change 
form of confirmation bias. In their model, an economic agent subject to 
confirmation bias interprets information signals as being confirmatory of his 
initial beliefs whether or not they actually are confirmatory. Depending on the 
extent of the bias, it can be difficult or even impossible for the agent to change 
his initial beliefs even in the face of a significant number of highly 
disconfirming information signals. The relevance and strength of the 
information signals becomes almost irrelevant in their model because the 
agent interprets information in a manner that supports his initial beliefs or 
ignores it completely.   
 
2.2 USING THE EXPLANATION EFFECT TO INDUCE CONFIRMATION 
BIAS 
 
Individuals who develop written explanations are more likely to persist in 
their beliefs in the face of disconfirming evidence than those who have not 
developed a written explanation (Anderson, et al., 1980).  The impact that a 
written explanation has on an individual’s future beliefs and behaviors is 
known as the “explanation effect.”  In the case of an individual forecasting a 
future outcome (e.g., future earnings, future movie box office receipts, winner 
of an election, etc.), the explanation effect generates a causal mental 
representation from available information (Hammersley, et al., 1997; 
Anderson, et al., 1980).  
In studies of causal representation, information that is more consistent 
with a subject’s initial written explanations receives more weight in 
subsequent assessments of the likelihood that the forecasted event will happen 
while inconsistent information will either receive less weight or be completely 
ignored (e.g. Ditto, et al,, 1998; Lord, et al., 1979). Thus, one of the 
consequences of eliciting a written explanation from individuals is 
confirmation bias, specifically biased assimilation that results in the under-
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weighting of information that is received after an initial explanation task when 
that new information is inconsistent with the initial explanation.  
It is important to note for this study that confirmation bias can affect more 
than beliefs. It can also alter future behavior in a manner that ignores 
information received subsequent to the creation of the initial written 
explanation (e.g. Sherman, 1980; Sherman, et al., 1981). In these studies, 
Sherman and his colleagues show that the written predictions that subjects 
make of their future behavior actually influences their eventual future 
behaviors.  While a considerable amount of the confirmation bias research 
literature focuses solely on the measurement of beliefs, Sherman (1980) and 
Sherman, et al. (1981) measure the impact that the written predictions 
themselves have on future behavior.  The implication of their work for this 
study is that the written forecasts our subjects generate should impact not only 
their forecasts, but also their trading behavior. 
 
2.3 THE EFFECTS OF CONFIRMATION BIAS ON MARKET PRICES 
 
Pouget, et al. (2014) model financial market participants in a manner that 
is similar to Rabin and Schrag (1999). They extend Rabin and Schrag (1999) 
to analytically examine how the extent of confirmation bias influences trader 
beliefs as reflected by market prices. As in Rabin and Schrug (1999), they 
model each information signal as being either positive or negative relative to 
initial beliefs.  One of their primary results is that markets including traders 
with confirmation bias misprice securities due to the degree to which biased 
traders’ interpretation of information signals are irrationally conditioned on 
their prior beliefs. In other words, traders’ biased beliefs results in behavior – 
as measured by security prices -- that does not reflect full incorporation of 
value-relevant, new information when it does not confirm their priors. Based 
on Pouget, et al. (2014), we can predict how traders in markets populated 
exclusively by those who submitted a written forecast will react to new 
information.  
Due to the explanation effect, we expect that the act of creating and 
justifying a written forecast will induce confirmation bias in these traders. 
Based on prior experimental research on confirmation bias and its effects on 
behavior, all of these traders with confirmation bias will not give sufficient 
weight to new information in updating their forecasts of the outcome of the 
market. Furthermore, they are unlikely to trade in a manner consistent with 
rational expectations. This leads to our first hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: In markets including only traders subject to 
confirmation bias, prices will reflect significant under-reaction to 
information received subsequent to initial belief formation. 
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In the Pouget, et al. (2014) model, they postulate that traders subject to the 
confirmation bias will eventually be joined in the market by rational traders 
who are not subject to the bias. These rational traders will fully incorporate 
public information.  Thus, Pouget, et al. (2014) predict that the unbiased 
traders will drive prices to be efficient in markets that include a mix of both 
biased and rational traders. This is consistent with some of the behavioral 
finance literature that shows the impact of individual psychological biases on 
market prices can be mitigated by the presence of unbiased traders (e.g. 
Ganguly, et al., 1994; Camerer, 1987; Camerer, 1992; Kluger and Wyatt, 
2004). It is also consistent with prior research on the efficiency of prediction 
markets (i.e., Forsythe, Rietz and Ross, 1999). 
These studies lead to our second hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: In markets including both traders subject to 
confirmation bias and unbiased traders, prices will efficiently reflect 
information received subsequent to initial belief formation. 
 
3 MARKET OVERVIEW 
 
The setting for our study is a real money prediction market in which 
participants trade securities whose value is tied to a future event. This market 
started operations in 1988 and is operated by the faculty of a large 
Midwestern university. As a market for research and teaching purposes, it has 
received two “no action” letters from the Division of Trading and Markets of 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. Since its inception, this market 
has accurately forecasted a large number of national, local and international 
elections relative to both the pre-election polls and actual election outcomes 
(Forsythe, et al., 1992; Berg, Nelson and Rietz 2008).  
All trading in this market is conducted via an anonymous, computerized 
double auction which accepts both market and limit orders. All limit orders 
(bids/asks) are queued by price and submission times. The best bid and ask 
prices are available to traders as are past daily average prices and transaction 
levels. An individual’s investment in the market is limited to $500 and no 
short selling is allowed.1 In addition, no transaction fees are charged to 
traders.  
Traders may acquire securities from the market in a bundle consisting of 
one of each of the securities in the market. A complete bundle of securities 
may be purchased from or sold to the exchange at any time for $1, the 
1 A trader may simulate a “short-sale” of a single security or set of securities 
by buying a $1 bundle and selling securities from that bundle that are 
expected to fall in price. After the expected fall in price, the securities may be 
purchased from other traders and the entire bundle sold back to the exchange 
for $1.  
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guaranteed liquidation value of the bundle. Therefore, the supply of securities 
in the market expands and shrinks as traders desire without contaminating the 
individual prices as set by the traders. 
 
3.1 MOVIE BOX OFFICE MARKETS 
 
The markets of interest in this study are focused on predicting the 
domestic box office performance of a particular movie in its first 4 weeks of 
release. In each market, a bundle of four to 8 securities was offered. Each 
security is associated with a mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive 
range of box office receipts within the specified four-week period. At the end 
of the market, only one of the securities pays off $1 while the others expire 
worthless. Consequently, the bundle of securities is a set of outcome-spanning 
Arrow-Debreu securities. For example, in a market conducted in late 2007, 
there were 5 securities associated with the movie Beowulf. They are presented 
in Table 1.  The prices of these securities represent the market’s collective 
estimate of the probability that the given movie’s box office receipts will fall 
within the relevant range after the first 4 weeks of release in theaters. 
 
Table 1:Security Definitions for Beowulf (2007) Movie Box Office Market 
 
Security Definition 
BEOW060L $1.00 if Beowulf’s official box office receipts for the 
11/16/07-12/13/07 period are lower than or equal to $60 
million; zero otherwise. 
BEOW070L $1.00 if Beowulf’s official box office receipts for the 
11/16/07-12/13/07 period are greater than $60 million and 
lower than or equal to $70 million; zero otherwise. 
BEOW080L $1.00 if Beowulf’s official box office receipts for the 
11/16/07-12/13/07 period are greater than $70 million and 
lower than or equal to $80 million; zero otherwise. 
BEOW090L $1.00 if Beowulf’s official box office receipts for the 
11/16/07-12/13/07 period are greater than $80 million and 
lower than or equal to $90 million; zero otherwise. 
BEOW090H $1.00 if Beowulf’s official box office receipts for the 
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Table 2: Movie Box Office Market Descriptions 
 














Lost in Space 3/27/1998 4/3/1998 4 - (open) 81/ 44 
Mercury Rising 3/27/1998 4/3/1998 4 - (open) 81/ 44 
Enemy of the 
State 
11/9/1998 11/20/1998 4 - (closed) 88/ 88 
I Still Know 
What You Did 
Last Summer 
11/9/1998 11/13/1998 5 - (closed) 88/ 88 
Sleepy Hollow 11/5/1999 11/19/1999 5 - (open) 345/ 106 
The World is not 
Enough 
11/5/1999 11/19/1999 5 - (open) 311/ 106 
The 6th Day 11/3/2000 11/17/2000 4 - (closed) 91/ 91 
How the Grinch 
Stole Christmas 
11/3/2000 11/17/2000 4 - (closed) 91/ 91 
Monsters, Inc. 10/19/2001 11/2/2001 5 - (open) 285/ 34 
Harry Potter and 
the Sorcerer’s 
Stone 
11/2/2001 11/16/2001 6 - (open) 380/ 111 
Die Another Day 11/8/2002 11/22/2002 5 - (open) 183/ 86 
The Cat in the 
Hat 
11/7/2003 11/21/2003 8 - (closed) 84/ 84 
The Sponge Bob 
Square Pants 
Movie 
11/5/2004 11/19/2004 6 - (closed) 58/ 58 
Happy Feet 11/3/2006 11/17/2006 5 - (closed) 106/ 106 
The Fountain 11/3/2006 11/22/2006 5 - (closed) 106/ 106 
300 2/23/2007 3/10/2007 5 - (closed) 58/ 58 
Beowulf 11/2/2007 11/16/2007 5 - (closed) 61/ 61 
Twilight 11/3/2008 11/21/2008 6 - (closed) 63/ 63 
 
Trading in all movie markets began from 4-19 days before the opening of 
the movie in theaters. Traders could access the market 24-hours a day through 
the Internet. Trading continued for four weeks after the opening of the movie. 
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The securities were liquidated after official four-week box office data became 
available. We are focusing on a set of 18 movie box office markets organized 
between 1998 and 2008. An overview of these markets is provided in Table 2. 
 
3.2 TRADERS  
Participation in these markets is limited to traders with an academic 
affiliation (including students, staff and faculty). There are two distinct types 
of markets being compared in this study. The first is denoted as a “closed” 
market. These are markets in which every trader was required to submit a 
point forecast of the 4-week box office performance for each movie supported 
by a 2-4 page justification of the forecast. An example of the forecasting 
instructions is available in the appendix.    
In exchange for their forecasts and accompanying written justifications, 
the traders were provided a $5 or $10 trading account (They could add more 
funds up to the $500 market limit). These traders were asked to execute at 
least two trades while the market was open (buying or selling a bundle of 
securities is considered a trade).  
The second type of market is denoted as an “open” market since market 
participation was open to all traders with an academic affiliation. Therefore, 
these markets consisted of a subset of traders who had provided a written 
forecast (and justification) before trading commenced and a subset of traders 
who did not participate in the forecasting experience. We refer to this latter 
group of traders in the open markets as “rational” or “unbiased” traders 
because they are not subject to the confirmation bias we induced by requiring 
forecasters to prepare, justify and submit a written forecast prior to trading. 
There are seven open markets in our study.  
 
3.3 MARKET TIMELINE 
 
The timeline of the market is provided in Figure 1.  The first step in the 
market timeline is the submission of the traders’ forecasts. This step pertains 
only to those traders. All other steps are common to all market participants. 
Once the forecasts are submitted, the movie box office market opens. Trading 
in the markets began before the opening of the movie in theaters. Once the 
movie opened in theaters, trading continued for four weeks.  
Nielsen/EDI (now owned by Rentrak) tracked movie box office 
performance following each weekend on a weekly basis. Daily estimates are 
also available at other web sites, e.g., the-numbers.com. After the final 4-
week receipts are available in print (through Variety), the markets are 
liquidated. This entails exchanging $1 for each winning security held by a 




THE JOURNAL OF PREDICTION MARKETS 
2014 8 3 
 
 
Figure 1: Movie Box Office Market Time Line 
 
3.4 PUBLIC INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO INVESTORS 
 
A movie’s performance in the first weekend of release is an important 
determinant of its overall performance (e.g., Krider & Weinberg, 1998; 
Pennock, Nielsen, & Giles, 2001). Most movies have their largest box office 
receipts in the first weekend, followed by a sharp drop-off in subsequent 
weeks. Therefore, when trying to predict the four-week box office 
performance of a given movie, traders should pay particular attention to its 
performance over the first weekend.  
There is a well-known relationship between the opening week-end 
performance of a movie and its total receipts over a 4-weekend time period. A 
large scale movie prediction game - the Hollywood Stock Exchange 
(HSX.com) - suggests that the four-week total is close to 2.9 times the 
opening weekend (Pennock, Nielsen, & Giles, 2001; Elberse, 2007; Elberse & 
Anand, 2007).2  
To evaluate how well the first weekend box office results can forecast the 
four-week total, we collected a sample of 417 movies released between 1999 
and 2001 from www.hollywoodstockjournal.org (on 6/11/2007). We 
compared two forecasts of the four-week box office total. The first is based on 
the HSX price on Friday night of the first weekend the movie is in theaters. 
Comparing this figure with the actual 4-week total, the mean absolute 
percentage error (MAPE) is 56%. Our second forecast was generated by 
2 This ratio is used to adjust prices of HSX securities on Monday after a trading halt 
on the opening Friday of wide release (> 500 screens) in theaters. The HSX trading 
halt is intended to reduce the impact of traders with insider information on the 
market’s prices.  
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multiplying the first weekend box office total by 2.9. The MAPE for this 
forecast was only 20%, a substantial reduction.  
Therefore, once a trader observes the opening weekend performance of a 
movie, the multiplier of 2.9 provides a relatively accurate point estimate of the 
four-week total. For example, the 2007 movie Beowulf made $27.5 million in 
its first weekend. Using the 2.9 multiplier, a trader would forecast a four-week 
total of $79.75 million. This is very close to the actual four-week total of 
$77.9 million, an absolute percentage error of 2.3%.  
While the movie multiplier provides an accurate point estimate of the 
four-week total, the actual multiplier does vary. Using the same sample of 417 
movies released between 1999 and 2001, we found that the average ratio 
between the first weekend box office performance and the four-weekend total 
was 2.85, very similar to the 2.9 ratio used by HSX.com. The standard 
deviation of the multipliers is 0.78. The multipliers in our sample have a 
distribution that does not significantly deviate from a log-normal distribution 
(Kolomogrov-Smirnov D = 1.161, p < 0.135) with a mean of 1.016 and a 
standard deviation of 0.241. We plotted the cumulative distribution of actual 
multipliers (loge transformed) against a normal distribution in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2: Movie Multiplier Distribution (n = 417) 
 
 
This plot shows that the distribution of the multipliers (using the loge 
transformation) is well-characterized by a normal distribution.  
Using this empirical distribution of movie multipliers, we can determine 
the expected security prices given the first weekend box office performance of 
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of the BEOW060L security is $60 million. Given first weekend box office 
receipts of $27.5 million, the likelihood of the four-week total being less than 
$60 million is the same as the probability that the multiplier is less than 2.18 
($60/$27.5 = 2.18). Given the (loge) mean and standard deviation of the 
distribution of multipliers, the corresponding Z-score is (2.180 - 1.016) / 
(0.241) = -0.98. The cumulative standard normal distribution at this point is 
0.163. This suggests that the probability that the actual multiplier will be less 
than 2.18 is 16.3%. This corresponds to the probability that Beowulf will 
make less than $60 million in its first four weeks given its actual opening 
weekend take of $27.5 million. Therefore, given the first weekend box office 
results, the expected value of the BEOW060L security is $0.163. 
The well-behaved relationship between the first weekend box office 
results and the four-week total provide a very good benchmark to evaluate 
security prices (and changes in prices) we observe in the movie box office 
markets. We will assess how well prices incorporate this public information 
about the ultimate value of the securities after the first weekend results are 
available to traders.  
 
4 MARKET PRICE UPDATE MODEL   
 
We model the market prices in response to new information using the 
following simple price update model:  
 
Pj,t = Pj,t-1 + wSj,t               (1) 
 
where Pi,t is the price of security j at time t, Pj,t-1 is the price of security j at 
time t-1, w is the adjustment weight for new information, Sj,t  is signal 
provided by the new information about the value of security j in time t.3  
For the initial price (Pj,t-1), we use the actual price of the individual 
security at midnight on the night before the movie opened in theaters. For the 
updated price (Pj,t), we use the security price at midnight on Monday 
following the first weekend.  While the official first-weekend results are 
available during the day on Monday, we measure the price at midnight to 
allow traders time to react to the official box office results.   
We define the signal (Sj,t) as the difference between the pre-opening (Pj,t-1) 
and the expected price (Ej,t) based on the first weekend box office results, i.e., 
Sj,t = (Ej,t – Pj,t-1) . For example, the actual price of the BEOW060L security 
the night before the movie opened in theaters (P1,t-1) was $0.0085. As noted in 
3 This is a much simpler asset pricing model than Rabin and Schrag 
(1999) and Pouget, et al.  (2014), but it embraces their assumption that market 
price evolves as a result of initial beliefs being established and then updated 
as a result of traders receiving, weighing and incorporating new information 
into the beliefs about an asset’s true value.  
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the previous section, based on the first weekend box office performance and 
the movie multiplier, the expected security price after the first weekend (E1,t) 
is $0.163. The signal (S1,t) from the first weekend’s results is positive (0.1545 
= 0.163 - 0.0085), indicating that the security was underpriced prior to the 
movie’s opening given the performance of the movie on its first weekend.    
Using prices before and after the first weekend of each movie and the 
historical movie multiplier, we can estimate the sensitivity of prices (Pj,t) to 
the signal (Sj,t = Ej,t – Pj,t-1) through the estimation of a weight parameter (w) 
by carrying the above substitutions through Equation (1) and moving the 
initial price (Pj,t-1) to the left hand side as follows: 
 
Pj,t – Pj,t-1 = w(Ej,t – Pj,t-1)             (2) 
 
The weight parameter estimate (w) measures the sensitivity of post-
weekend prices to the information signal of first weekend box office receipts 
and the movie multiplier relative to prices prior to the weekend as follows:   
 
w = (Pj,t – Pj,t-1) / (Ej,t – Pj,t-1)           (3) 
 
An estimate of w equal to 1 implies efficient incorporation of that 
information signal. In the above example, if the actual price of the 
BEOW060L security on Monday (P1,t) is $0.163, then the price change (P1,t – 
P1,t-1) is $0.1545 which is the exact amount of change in price expected (E1,t – 
P1,t-1).  However, if w is estimated to be less than 1 due to P1,t being less than 
$0.163 (i.e., $0.10) the implication is that traders under-reacted to the new 
information. 
We illustrate the construction of our dependent and independent variables 
across all securities in a market using the data from the 2000 market for The 
6th Day. A total of four securities were offered: SIX50L which is bounded 
above at a 4 week box office total of $50 million, SIX70L which pays $1 if 
the movie made more than $50 million and less than $70 million, SIX90L 
which pays $1 if the movie made more than $70 million and less than $90 
million and SIX90H which pays $1 in the event the movie made more than 
$90 million in its first 4 weeks of wide release (between 11/17/2000 and 
12/15/2000). All markets were constructed in a similar manner. 
Continuing with The 6th Day example, the prices of these securities at 
midnight on Thursday (Pj,t-1) before the movie opened in theaters (in black) 
and at midnight on Monday after the movie opened in theaters (Pj,t in grey) 
are presented in Figure 3. 
The first weekend’s box office total was $13.02 million. Applying the 
parameters of the log-normal distribution of movie multipliers to the first 
weekend’s receipts, we computed the expected prices (Ej,t) of each of the 
security. These prices are indicated by white bars (with dots).  The resulting 
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dependent and independent variables for each security in The 6th Day market 
are presented in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 3: Security Price Changes in Movie Box Office Market for The 6th Day 
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We followed this same estimation procedure of variables across all of our 
movie markets to estimate the weight parameter (w) in equation 2.  
 
5 RESULTS  
 
The unit of analysis is the individual security. Across the 18 markets in 
this study, there were 91 different securities offered to traders. We estimated 
the weight parameter (w) for the pooled set of markets and separately for 
closed and open markets using OLS with heteroskedastic-robust standard 
errors. 
The results of our model estimation are presented in Table 3.  The results 
of the model estimated across all securities in all markets is highly significant 
(F = 74.01 p < 0.001). The high level of fit (R2 = 0.56) suggests that the 
changes in security prices are strongly influenced by the information provided 
by the first weekend box office performance. The intercept in the model is not 
significant (p = 0.142 for a two-tailed test). This suggests there is no general 
tendency for security prices to rise or fall with the release of new information 
about box office performance. The new information about the value of a 
security has a positive (w = 0.824) and significant (p < 0.001) impact on the 
observed changes in security prices.   
 
 
Table 3: Regression Results for All Markets, Closed Markets and Open Markets 
 




Constant 0.027 (0.142) 0.031 (0.172) 0.021 (0.730) 
w: sensitivity to new 
information  
0.824 (<0.001) 0.768 (<0.001) 1.089 (<0.001) 
R2 0.56 0.58 0.56 
F-value 74.01 (<0.001) 59.90 (<0.001) 18.03 (<0.001) 
Number of Observations 91 57 34 
Hypotheses for Parameter 
Tests 
 H0: w = 1 
H1: w ≠ 1 
H0: w = 1 
H1: w ≠ 1 
t-statistic    2.34 (0.020) 
Reject H0 
0.31 (0.760) 
Fail to reject 
H0 
 
a p-value in parentheses. 
 
A coefficient of 1 would indicate efficient (or 100%) incorporation of the 
information revealed by the signal (i.e., the first weekend box office and 
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multiplier) into market prices.  We hypothesize that while closed markets will 
generate prices that reflect significant under-reaction to the information signal 
(w < 1) due to confirmation bias of all traders, the impact of conformation 
bias on prices will be mitigated in markets that are open to unbiased traders.  
Tests of our hypotheses in the subsequent sections will require both a) 
separate analysis of closed versus open markets and b) tests of the 
significance of the weight parameter w relative to 1 instead of 0. 
  
5.1 THE IMPACT OF CONFIRMATION BIAS IN CLOSED MARKETS 
 
There were a total of 57 securities offered in the 11 closed markets. (The 
parameter estimates are also presented in Table 3). The overall model is 
significant (F = 59.90, p < 0.001). The high level of fit (R2 = 0.58) suggests 
that in markets in which all traders have created and submitted a written 
explanation, the release of interim performance data does affect prices. The 
intercept is not significant (p = 0.172). The coefficient for the influence of 
new information (w) is positive (0.759) and significantly different from zero 
(p < 0.001).  To test Hypothesis 1, we compared the weight parameter (w) to 
1. Using a 2-tailed test, we reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient is 
equal to 1 (t-statistic = 2.34, p < 0.02).  Consistent with Hypothesis 1, we find 
that prices in a market consisting solely of traders subject to confirmation bias 
significantly under-react to new information.  
 
5.2 THE IMPACT OF UNBIASED TRADERS 
 
In Hypothesis 2, we predict that the presence of unbiased or rational 
traders may correct the impact of confirmation bias on market prices.  We test 
this hypothesis in 7 additional open markets where the pool of traders includes 
both traders who have created and submitted a written explanation as well as 
traders we consider to be unbiased because they have not (to our knowledge) 
created a written forecast of the market outcome. There were 34 securities 
offered in the 7 open markets. The results of the model estimation are also 
presented in Table 3. 
The model is significant (F = 18.03, p < 0.001) and has a high level of fit 
(R2 = 0.56). These results imply that the observed price changes for these 
securities are strongly influenced by the information conveyed by the first 
weekend box office performance. The intercept is not significant (p = 0.469). 
The coefficient for the effect of new information on the changes in security 
prices (w) is positive (1.09) and significantly different from zero (p < 0.001).  
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the presence of unbiased traders should result 
in price changes that neither under-react nor over-react to new information. 
This means the coefficient (w) should not differ significantly from 1. A two-
tailed t-test fails to reject the null hypothesis that w = 1 (t-statistic = 0.32, p = 
0.76). This result supports Hypothesis 2.  
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6  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The support for both of our hypotheses provides insight into how 
confirmation bias can be induced by having individuals provide a written 
forecast prior to market participation and how that bias impacts market prices.  
In closed markets consisting solely of biased traders, market prices reflect 
under-reaction to new, value-relevant information.  Thus, the mere 
involvement of biased traders in a market does not, by itself, result in efficient 
information processing by traders as reflected by changes in market prices. 
However, in markets that are opened to traders who have not submitted a 
written forecast, market prices do not reflect under-reaction.  These findings 
extend the current stream of research showing that the inclusion of rational 
traders in markets with irrational traders can result in efficient market prices 
(e.g. Ganguly, et al., 1994; Camerer, 1987; Camerer, 1992; Kluger and Wyatt, 
2004). 
We believe our results may provide insights into patterns of forecasting 
updating (or the lack thereof) observed in U.S. equity markets.  Much like our 
biased traders, professional equity research analysts prepare and publish 
written forecasts of a company’s future earnings that include significant 
explanations and justifications for their forecast.  Their explanations include 
substantial qualitative and quantitative analysis of firm-specific, industry, and 
macroeconomic factors.  Analysts are subject to explanation requirements 
while other relevant groups (i.e., individual and institutional investors) are 
not.  In fact, only analysts publicly report their earnings forecasts, 
explanations of their forecasts, or subsequent revisions to them.  Thus, the 
conditions under which the explanation effect can influence forecast revision 
exist in the realm of professional earnings forecasting.  
As new information becomes available, analysts may or may not revise 
their forecasts and publish their forecast revisions. Multiple studies suggest 
that analysts routinely under-react to new information in their revisions of 
initial earnings forecasts (i.e., Abarbanell and Bernard, 1992; Elliott, Philbrick 
and Wiedman, 1995; Easterwood and Nutt, 1999); Kasznik and McNichols, 
2002).  Elliott et al. (1995) suggest that analysts “appear prone to underweight 
new information and thus to under-revise their beliefs as new information is 
received during the year” (p. 934).  However, this type of archival research 
does not allow the researcher to identify the causes of analysts’ insufficient 
revision of their forecasts.  
Interestingly, Liu (2003) and Hughes, et al. (2008) suggest that one reason 
that (sell-side) analysts do not fully incorporate new information into their 
revisions is because they lack the economic incentives to do so. Specifically, 
analysts do not have their own funds invested in the companies for which they 
are producing earnings forecasts. This is an interesting thought experiment 
which has to remain in the realm of conjecture While having analysts reduce 
their biases by trading in a market is consistent with traditional financial 
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theory on efficient markets, it is also untestable since analysts are barred from 
trading in companies they report on within 30 days before and 5 days after 
they issue an earnings forecast.  
We do not claim that the traders in these prediction markets are the same 
as professional analysts. However, the results of this study do have 
implications for the stream of research on how financial analysts revise their 
forecasts based on new information. First, prior research on the explanation 
effect suggests that financial analysts will be prone to confirmation bias due to 
the process of forecasting earnings and justifying that forecast in writing. This 
psychological explanation for the often observed tendency for analysts to 
underweight new information is a reasonable alternative to explanations such 
as optimism (Easterwood and Nutt, 1999) or herding behavior (Scharfstein 
and Stein, 1990; Trueman, 1994). 
Second, our study involves traders subject to confirmation bias that is 
induced by creating and justifying a forecast. Traders in these prediction 
markets have strong economic incentives to take advantage of all value-
relevant information as they buy and sell securities. In spite of those 
incentives, when trading only amongst themselves, our forecasting traders do 
not generate market prices that fully incorporate new information. Therefore, 
we speculate that if the reason that financial analysts often ignore new 
information that is inconsistent with their prior beliefs (and current earnings 
forecast) due to the explanation effect, then trading in a market, even if 
possible, would not get rid of that bias.      
As with any empirical study, there are limitations to this work derived 
from both its controlled and natural features. These are small-scale markets 
and not part of any trader’s overall asset portfolio. These markets are 
somewhat stylized due to the trader population (primarily MBA students and 
other academics), the focus of the markets (movie box office predictions) and 
the forecasting assignment (justifying a box office prediction in writing). 
Also, we do not know much about the unbiased traders beyond the fact that 
they have an academic affiliation and invested their own money.  
In this study, we extend the existing research on the effects of 
confirmation bias from the realms of the laboratory and the analytic model to 
a field setting. To our knowledge, all previous empirical research on 
confirmation bias focuses on the individual. We extend this stream of research 
by concentrating on the effect of confirmation bias on the market as a whole 
(as reflected in price changes). In these movie prediction markets, 
confirmation bias was induced in some traders via the explanation effect. 
When all traders are subject to confirmation bias, market prices do not 
accurately reflect new, value-relevant information. However, the presence of 
non-biased traders does lead to efficient incorporation of new information into 
market prices.  
In conclusion, this study makes two important contributions. First, we 
focus on an important information processing bias – confirmation bias - that 
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has not been studied in a market setting. Second, we extend our understanding 
of the conditions under which this individual bias will affect prices in a real-
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Movie Forecasting Assignment 
 
In early November (the 3rd to be exact), we will open trading in two 
movie box office markets through the MOVIE MARKET. The value of the 
futures contracts in these markets will be determined by the 4 week (through 
December 14th) total domestic box office sales for two movies scheduled to 
open on November 17th. These movies are How the Grinch Stole Christmas 
and The Sixth Day. You can check out how the top movies in America are 
faring at the AC Neilsen Entertainment Data, Inc. site (entdata.com).  
You will have two tasks related to these markets. First, each student will 
individually develop a forecast for the box office returns for these two movies 
based on sources available on the Internet. Second, you will have to make 
trades in the markets based on your forecasts. You are required to make at 
least one trade in each market before the movies open and at least one trade in 
each market after the movies open. Failure to make these trades will result in 
a grade of Fail for the entire assignment. There is no make up for the trade 
portion of this assignment. 
On the Thursday, November 2nd, each student will turn in a two-three 
page memo which contains your forecasts for the two movies. You should 
discuss what information sources you used to develop the forecasts and how 
these sources were integrated to yield the final forecasts.  
One question you might have is: How do I forecast the results for a movie 
that is not yet in theaters? This is a key question faced by executives in the 
movie industry from production companies all the way down to the owners of 
a neighborhood cinema. You should start by visiting the movies’ web pages. 
Then, using box office data from the past available on the web, look at the 
success of similar movies. These could be movies with the same stars, 
directors, type of plot or even same time of release in the year. In addition to 
the Internet resources, back issues of Variety (Main Library) contain weekly 
results for the top 50 movies in the country.  
In most forecasting assignments, your hard work results in either a good 
grade or bad grade depending on how the actual event turns out. This 
assignment is very different because your hard work can pay off in real 
money through the MOVIE MARKET futures contracts. In addition, since 
there is trading over time and information revealed about the movies’ 
performance at the box office every weekend, there are opportunities to profit 
even if your original forecast is incorrect.  
I would encourage you to try out the simulated trading via the MOVIE 
MARKET web site before you have to make your required trades. Unlike the 
simulation or practice trades, the actual trades on your account cannot be 
reversed. 
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